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MIRANDA, MORALITY, AND COURT-CREATED CAVEATS:

A

REPLY TO MALVINA

HALBERSTAM

G. Kristian Miccio*
There are times when I consider the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to
be a nuisance. There are other times when I view it as an impediment to accountability and
justice. But these are not my concerns at the moment; rather, what Malvina Halberstam's article,
Requiring Miranda Warnings for the Christmas Day Bomber and Other Terrorists, has raised is a
rather interesting discussion on whether Miranda' is either viable or desirable when discussing
notions of national security. Indeed, Halberstam correctly notes that the New York v. Quarles
decision, which crafted a public safety exception to Miranda, 2 lays the groundwork for the slow
chipping away of protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment. What Professor Halberstam
does not address are the moral consequences that the chipping-away process produces as well
as the Court's crabbed view of Miranda violations within the context of police negligence or
wilful refusal to follow Miranda admonitions. And yet, it is the moral questions raised by Quarles
and its progeny that are worthy of discourse and debate; thus these questions will be the focus
of my reply to Professor Halberstam's article.
Let's be honest, shall we? Miranda was fashioned to protect the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, nothing more, nothing less. And, the Miranda warnings fashioned by
the Court were a necessary maneuver because a police-dominated environment, coupled with
police initiated and controlled interrogation, is inherently coercive. 3 We can all agree, regardless
of our political, philosophical, or legal point of view, that while a police controlled environment
and interrogation is coercive it triggers neither a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process concern
or violation. But such a setting is nonetheless both formidable and intimidating, and thus worthy
of constitutional protection under the Fifth Amendment.
Neither Quarles, United States v. Patane, 4 Dickerson v. United States,5 nor Professor
Halberstam's thesis disturbs this basic and fundamental notion concerning the coercive effect of
custodial interrogation. Moreover, they neither contradict nor contest the view that such
interrogation has a corrosive effect on the right against self-incrimination-a view not only
consistent with Miranda's raison d'etre, but consonant with the moral values that establish the
* J.D., LL.M., J.S.D. from Columbia Law School. Fulbright Scholar to Ireland, Fulbright Senior Specialist, Marie
Curie Transfer of Knowledge Scholar to the EU, Erasmus Mundus Scholar to Italy and Spain, Professor of Law,
the Sturm College of Law, University of Denver and former NYC prosecutor and founding director of the
Centre for Battered Women's Legal Services, NYC.
I The Miranda doctrine requires that " [p]rior to any questioning, the [suspect in custody] must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.' Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
2 467 U.S 649, 655-56 (1984).
3 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 458 (concluding that 'without proper safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which
work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise
do so freely," and that " [u]nless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion
inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of
his free choice").
4 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (plurality opinion).
5 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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right. The real bone of contention, or contested premise, is the Court's and Halberstam's
location of the violation, and the ever expanding exceptions that place Miranda outside the
ambit of either a principled deviation or digression.
I.

THE MORAL FOUNDATION FOR MIRANDA

Why should we have a right against self-incrimination? Is it embedded in our Constitution
because a cadre of British ex-pats were dissatisfied with how they were treated by the Crown? 6
Could it be a holdover from either the romantics or the natural law aficionados? Or does this
right reflect actions and social practices that are not only morally justifiable but morally
grounded? In a word, yes.7 The right to silence has moorings in a moral framework that ratifies
the dignity of the autonomous individual and the inviolable nature of one's thoughts and words. 8
And, while the founding fathers may not have wrapped themselves in Kantian or Rawlsian
conceptions of individual rights and state responsibility to protect such rights, they certainly held
firm to the idea that the individual had a right to choose when and if to disclose information to
another person, and most certainly to the State qua State.9
The notion of the autonomous individual was a rather novel concept in the Eighteenth
Century, 10 but it pervades our constitutional scholarship and is supported by the moral idea that
the individual and her papers, ideas, and thoughts are beyond the control of the State. Indeed,
in the absence of probable cause, the State is barred from compromising the privacy of the
individual in her home, papers, effects, and body.1 1 The idea that the State can extract
information from an individual through the use of police-controlled interrogation within a policedominated environment wreaks havoc on our conceptions of the autonomy and dignity of the
individual.
Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which conditions violations upon the reasonableness of
State conduct, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination has no such condition. 12 The
language is unambiguous: "nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." 13 And, while there has been some debate about the interpretation of the word "shall"
by such noted jurists as Justice Antonin Scalia, 14 for those of us who adhere to not only common
sense but to the common understanding of such words as "shall" and "may," there really is no
principled dispute related to these words.
I want it understood from the start that I am not addressing, debating, or critiquing issues
about a moral duty owed by individuals to the State, to other members of society, or to oneself
6

See generally

LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968)

(discussing the English history of the right against self-incrimination). It was not until 1848 that a statute
protecting a defendant's right to silence became law in England. Id. at 375. Indeed, criminal defendants
did not have full legal representation rights until 1836. Id. at 322.
7 Cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630-32 (1886) (discussing conceivable justifications for the right
against self-incrimination).

8 See R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 42-43 (1981).
Although Professor Greenawalt's article is devoted to silence as a private right, his analysis is applicable
within the criminal law context primarily due to the fact that the autonomous nature of the individual does
not change. See id. at 49.
9 See LEVY, supra note 6, at 430-31.
i

0

See id. at 423.

11 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Of course there is the Terry exception to both the probable cause and warrant
requirements. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 24 (1968). But that exception does have limits and, if adhered to,
creates a limited interference with Fourth Amendment protections. See id. at 33.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

I3 Id.
14

Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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regarding truth or its close approximation. Rather, I am focusing on the moral imperative that
forms the basis for the right to silence and the moral impoverishment that accompanies Courtconstructed caveats. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is at once a
limitation on State power to compel statements and a shield to protect defendant's decision to
remain mute. The enunciation of Miranda standards and admonitions creates a presumption
that unwarned statements are compelled. 15 Miranda was unequivocal in finding that a policedominated environment and interrogation was State created compulsion regardless of whether
police conduct was negligent or willful. 16 There were no caveats: not a public safety exemption,
private safety exemption, nor national security exclusion.1 7 I am sure that the Warren Court was
aware of various conditions that could give rise to such exceptions, not the least of which were
threats to national security and domestic tranquility precipitated by the violence of the Cold
War, the Vietnam War, and Southern white supremacy movements.
Yet, the Warren Court did not yield nor compromise. And, while silence may not be
golden, it is within the province of the criminal defendant to maintain her silence even in the
most heinous of circumstances. Indeed, it is when we are confronted with the unthinkable or the
most heinous behavior that the moral mettle of our beliefs is tested-and in the case of Miranda,
we have failed miserably.
The Quarles decision is a stellar example of the moral paucity that frames Miranda
jurisprudence. There was no quarrel or even discussion concerning the efficacy of police
conduct in that case. The identification of a rapist by the survivor, coupled with the credible
claim that the perpetrator was armed, gave the police the requisite probable cause to arrest. 18
The fact that the rapist was located in a public space made an arrest sons warrant within the
ambit of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.1 9 And the question - "Where is the gun?" - was not
only appropriate to, but necessitated by the circumstances presented to the officers at the
time. 20
This much is unobjectionable. The problem lies not with the inquiry by police but with the
use of the defendant's response at trial. The language and message of Miranda are clear:
unwarned statements are presumptively unconstitutional and cannot be introduced in the
People's case in chief.21 As the Cowardly Lion put it, "No way ... no how." 2 2 The Quarles Court,
however, in an attempt to weasel out of addressing a simple legal question that admittedly
implicates a profoundly complex moral issue, creates a "public safety exception." 23 And there
you have it. If there is an immediate threat to public safety, the Fifth Amendment right to silence
is obviated. How incredibly simple; how incredibly offensive to our notions of justice and
fundamental fairness.
What then is the morally consistent and constitutionally coherent position that the Court
should have adopted? It is this: Where public safety is threatened, police ought to ask whatever
questions are necessary to abate the threat. If time is of the essence, the six seconds it takes to
administer Miranda should be abandoned. Though the warnings may be jettisoned, however,
the constitutional moorings may not be compromised. Consequently, while police questioning
may be warranted, introduction of those statements at trial is neither defensible nor justified.
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 683 (1984).
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-61 (1966); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (holding
officer's subjective intent to incriminate is not determinative of whether "interrogation" occurred).
17 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460-6 1.
15

16

See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652.
19 See id. at 652, 653 n.3.
20 See id. at 653.
21 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
22 THE WIZARD OF Oz (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
23 See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655-56.
18
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Introduction of the statements is indefensible because the language of the Fifth Amendment
and Miranda is unequivocal: no criminal defendant shall be compelled to speak, and
compulsion is inherent in police interrogation within a police-dominated environment. 24 Under
Miranda, such compulsion is not obviated by any circumstances; police-controlled interrogation
constitutes a Fifth Amendment precondition for warnings by the State, period. 25 And introduction
of a Quarles-like statement at trial is unjustified because the conditions that gave rise to the
unwarned questions have abated. And failure to warn cannot be cured; Miranda did not
create a "boo-boo" or "oops" doctrine.
Yet, there is a more compelling reason not to create such exceptions. The Constitution,
and more specifically the Bill of Rights, constructs the terrain that supports notions of individual
liberty. Moreover, individual liberty is grounded in moral principles of dignity; the integrity of the
self, the right to be silent and to be free from compelled speech, are central to notions of the
autonomous self. While a strict Kantian approach to mediating the tension between the "I" and
the "We" is untenable, the scheme crafted by the Miranda Court incorporates a standard that
diminishes neither the rights of the individual nor those of society. Indeed, there is nothing to
prevent police from asking questions sons Miranda even absent a Quarles-like situation; at trial,
however, the state must rely exclusively on evidence other than the unwarned statements. 26
With the advent of the War on Terror, we have seen a rather frantic chipping away of
basic liberties embedded in the Bill of Rights. Now, in addition to having the privacy of luggage
violated, airplane travellers are forced to submit either to the dreaded body scanner or to an
invasive pat down. We have jettisoned any pretext of adherence to Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures under the auspices of the age old
canard of "national security." But think for a minute. Any self-respecting terrorist is going to secret
explosive materials in places where either the body scanner or the hyper-sexualized pat down
cannot reach. Indeed, the body scanner or pat down cannot reveal objects lodged in body
cavities. 27 Any prosecutor worth her salt knows that body cavities are the site of choice for those
wishing to transport contraband through airports and across borders. 28 Nonetheless, we walk in
line, handing over our luggage and our bodies for inspection because we are told that not to
acquiesce is an unpatriotic slap in the face to our notions of national security.
The chipping-away process affects the entire panoply of rights that secure notions of
freedom and individual liberty. And, while there is no question that our world has become less
safe, one factor that contributes to an unsafe environment is the whittling away of basic liberties.
The power of the state to invade not only our thoughts but our bodies has increased; indeed,
the decline in individual liberty is tied to the notion that once the phrase "national security" is
uttered, the Bill of Rights becomes illusory. And yet, it is at this moment, when national security is
compromised, that our adherence to constitutional principles and the moral framework that
shapes them is put to the test. This is true with any relationship, whether between individuals or
between the individual and the polity. Should the courts enforce Miranda or Fourth Amendment
protections only when the political or cultural environment is copacetic? Should not such
protections be strengthened when that environment is under attack, as proof of our adherence
to basic notions of ordered liberty and individual freedom? Abrogating or weakening the Fifth
Amendment is as detrimental to the moral and cultural life of our society as the bombing of the
24

U.S. CONST. amend. V; Miranda,

384 U.S. at 460-61.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460-61.
See id. at 444-45.
27 Colleen Deal, Comment, Faith or Flight?: A Religious Dilemma, 76 J. Air L. Com. 525, 554 (2011) (citing
Zack Kaldveer, Airport Body Scanner Update DHS Answers EPIC, Nader/Paul, and Alternatives, PRIVACY
REVOLT! BLOG (Jan. 7, 2011), http://consumercal.blogspot.com/20 11/01 /airport-body-scanner-update-dhs25
26

answers.html).

Steven Vina, Comment, Virtual Strip Searches at Airports: Are Border Searches Seeing Through the Fourth
Amendment?, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 417, 428 (2002).
28
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World Trade Center or other criminal activity. Undoubtedly, the framers of our Constitution and
the Bill of Rights were aware of subtle encroachments on individual liberty. They knew that
"illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure." 29 Quarles and its expansion reflect reflect the
very concerns expressed by the architects of our enabling documents; such prescience is at
once uncanny and disturbing.
II.

LOCATING THE RIGHT

Professor Halberstam's article raises another rather intriguing question: when is the right to
silence violated? According to the professor and the Court, the location of the violation is when
the State attempts to admit unwarned statements at trial. 30 Indeed, Halberstam cites United
States v. Patane to support the claim that the violation occurs "at trial." 31 Is she correct? More
importantly, is Patane correct?
Halberstam states,
Although it is frequently stated that law enforcement officials are required to give Miranda
warnings before questioning a suspect in custody, it is not a violation of Miranda for police
to question a suspect without first giving him the warnings .... It is only a violation to use
the incriminating statements in evidence against him at trial. 32
I understand that Professor Halberstam relies on Patane as foundational to her assertion.
But there is a problem with her analysis, and with her claim that Miranda is violated solely upon
the introduction of unwarned statements at trial. First, such a claim defies the plain language of
Miranda. The Miranda Court was unequivocal in its command; words like "shall" and "must"
were used throughout the opinion and tied specifically to what the police must do to collect
statements that are the product of "free will." 3 3 There is no debate, no equivocation, and no
speculation whatsoever. If the State wishes to extract evidence from the defendant's own
words, those words must follow adequate Miranda warnings.
Second, the assertion that the Fifth Amendment privilege is confined to criminal court
proceedings is counter to the language and rationale of Miranda. The Court stated, "Today,
then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is
curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves." 34 The Court
could not have been any clearer. But to assuage any remaining doubts, the Court reinforced
when Miranda applies and when it is violated by the state:
The privilege against self-incrimination . . is the essential mainstay of our adversary system
and guarantees to the individual the right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in
the unfettered exercise of his own will, during a period of custodial interrogation, as well as
in the courts or during the course of other official investigations. 35

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
30 Malvina Halberstam, Requiring Miranda Warnings for the Christmas Day Bomber and Other Terrorists, 2 U.
29

DENV. CRIM.

L.

REV.

1, 3-4 (2012).

Id.at 3.
32 Id. at 3-4.
33 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (" [T]he accused must be adequately and effectively
apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored."); id. at 474 ( If the individual
states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.').
34 Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
35 Id. at 460, 467.
31
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Third, a Miranda violation is a two-step process. Part one is collection of statements that
are unwarned, the consequence of inadequate warnings or defective waiver; part two is the
introduction of the statements at trial. 36 The taint is the collection of unwarned statements and
their introduction at trial. 37 Failure to warn is a condition precedent and introduction of such
statements is a condition subsequent. Absent introduction of unwarned statements at trial, the
failure to warn does not create a Fifth Amendment violation. Consequently, Halberstam's claim
distorts Miranda and the logical connection between compelled statements and the Fifth
Amendment right to silence. Moreover, her assertion grossly overstates the flawed findings of
Patane. Patane, rather circuitously, comes out in the same place as my two-step analysis of the
"taint." 38 Additionally, Patane was concerned with the exclusion of evidence outside the scope
of the statement qua statement. 39 The Court has consistently refused to extend the exclusionary
rule to evidence contained within the statement absent a Fourteenth Amendment due process
violation. 40 It is conceivable that Patane's rather specious reasoning rests not only on past,
equally specious plurality decisions, but on a refusal to extend the exclusionary rule beyond
what was outlined in Dickerson. 41
III.

CONCLUSION

Where do we go from here? I would like to think that as scholars we would make
principled decisions when addressing constitutional protections, fundamental rights, and state
interests regarding national security and criminality. The principled approach is to recognize the
tension that exists between individual rights and state interests to thwart terrorism and crime, and
to give law enforcement the necessary tools to ferret out such conduct, but not at the expense
of vitiating Fifth Amendment protection. The State has every right to circumvent Miranda in order
to identify potential threats to our national security. It does not have the right to do so at the
expense of the right against self-incrimination. Let the defendant speak in the absence of
Miranda warnings, but let us stand upon principle and refuse to defend introduction of such
statements at trial. Perhaps, if we affirm such rights, the courts shall follow.

See id. at 478-79.
37 Id.; see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003) (holding that coercive interrogation did not
violate respondent's constitutional rights where he was not charged with any crime and his statements
were not used against him in a criminal proceeding); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641 (2004)
(plurality opinion) (noting that negligent or intentional failure by police to provide Miranda warnings,
without more, does not constitute a constitutional violation).
38 Patane is truly tortured in its explanation and rational. Initially, the Court states that a failure to give
Miranda statements, by itself, does not constitute a Fifth Amendment violation. 542 U.S. at 641. It then goes
on to state that mere negligence or wilful conduct to withhold Miranda warnings does not create a
violation unless those statements are introduced at trial. Id. The Court fails to recognize the dependent
relationship that exists between pre-trial police conduct and prosecutorial conduct regarding introduction
of unwarned statements.
39 See id. at 643.
40 See id at 642; Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441-43 (1984).
41 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (holding that, since Miranda requirements are
constitutionally based, they cannot be legislatively superseded by Congress).
36
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